Predictive Policing and the Think Family Database

Predictive Policing, or Predictive Analytics, is increasingly being promoted as a tool to help police forces prevent crime before it happens. Supporters argue that analysing vast amounts of data can help identify vulnerable people, allocate resources more effectively and enable earlier intervention. However, a recent investigation published by WIRED magazine raises important questions about whether these systems are accurate, transparent or fair enough to justify their growing use. 

WIRED, working in partnership with the nonprofit newsroom Liberty Investigates, plus the Bristol Cable and Lighthouse Reports, obtained hundreds of pages of documentation, using FOI requests, to build a comprehensive picture of a long-running partnership between Avon and Somerset Police and Bristol City Council to develop predictive policing and safeguarding tools. It reveals how the two organisations worked together to combine public sector data, develop machine-learning models and deploy risk-scoring systems intended to support policing and child protection.  

The Think Family Database 

One of these systems was the Think Family Database which was launched in 2016. According to WIRED, the database brought together information held by multiple public bodies, creating records covering almost half a million Bristol residents.
The council played a central role by contributing and managing information from housing, education, children’s services, social care and other local authority functions, while police intelligence and crime data were also incorporated. The intention was to provide practitioners across organisations with a more complete understanding of individuals and families who might require support, enabling earlier intervention and better coordination between agencies. 

Using this shared data, the two organisations developed numerous machine-learning models designed to predict a range of outcomes. These included identifying people considered at greater risk of offending, becoming victims of crime, going missing or failing to appear in court. Other models sought to identify children who might be vulnerable to criminal or sexual exploitation. 

On paper, these objectives reflected a broader ambition shared by many public sector organisations: using data more effectively to improve services and prevent harm before it occurs. Former project leaders interviewed by WIRED argued that combining information from different public bodies could provide frontline professionals with a richer understanding of vulnerability than any single agency could achieve alone. However, the investigation suggests that the practical reality proved far more challenging.  

Accuracy and Transparency  

One of the most significant findings reported by WIRED is that at least two of the predictive models were eventually withdrawn because staff no longer trusted their results. Bristol City Council commissioned independent evaluations of the programme, and council practitioners reportedly questioned whether some of the safeguarding models were accurately identifying the children they were intended to protect. According to the investigation, staff expressed concern that some vulnerable children were no longer appearing within the highest-risk groups, while other individuals received unexpectedly high risk scores. Internal reviews ultimately concluded that the models lacked sufficient reliability to support operational decision-making, leading to their withdrawal. 

The investigation also highlights wider concerns surrounding transparency and governance. Independent reviewers reportedly found that documentation explaining how some of the predictive models had been developed was incomplete or unavailable. In some, reviewers were unable to fully assess the systems because source code, technical documentation and records describing how models had been trained or validated could not be located. 

Predictive AI systems depend heavily on the information used to train them.
If historical datasets contain gaps, inaccuracies or existing biases, those weaknesses may also be reflected in the predictions generated by the models. 
Researchers interviewed by WIRED note that some variables used within the aforementioned systems could act as indirect indicators of poverty or wider social disadvantage. Factors such as housing support, school attendance or eligibility for free school meals may correlate with vulnerability, but they may also reflect structural inequalities rather than future criminal behaviour. This raises concerns that predictive systems could unintentionally reinforce existing patterns of disadvantage rather than objectively identifying risk. 

The investigation also reports that one external audit found many of the predictive models demonstrated relatively weak performance. According to WIRED, an independent AI auditing company concluded that several models produced a high number of false positives, meaning many individuals identified as high risk would never actually experience the outcomes the models were predicting. False positives are particularly significant within policing and safeguarding because they have the potential to influence professional judgement and the allocation of limited public resources. Even where algorithmic scores do not determine decisions directly, they may shape how practitioners prioritise cases or assess individuals. 

The investigation further explores issues surrounding public awareness and consent. Many residents reportedly had little knowledge that their information had been brought together within the Think Family Database. One campaigner only discovered that his information had been included within a police offender management system after pursuing legal action to obtain details of the records held about him.  

Interestingly, former project leaders interviewed by WIRED argued that frontline professionals often relied more heavily on their own experience than on the algorithmic predictions themselves. Social workers and other practitioners reportedly viewed the models as one source of information rather than definitive guidance.
While this may have reduced the practical impact of inaccurate predictions, it also raises legitimate questions about the value of developing complex predictive systems if experienced professionals ultimately lacked confidence in the results. 

Future Use 

The investigation also highlights Bristol City Council’s role in reviewing the future of the programme. The council has since stated that the current administration no longer uses predictive analytics for policing or safeguarding decisions, with the exception of analytical work aimed at identifying young people who may become Not in Education, Employment or Training (NEET) after leaving school. The council also maintained that predictive tools never replaced professional judgement and were intended only to support practitioners rather than automate decisions. 

Automated Racism 

In the next episode of the Guardians of Data Podcast (published on Wednesday we discuss predictive policing and its impact in detail. Our guest is Ilyas Nagdee who is the Racial Justice Director at Amnesty International UK and one of the authors of Amnesty’s report into predictive policing (“Automated Racism). Ilyas helps us unpack what the predictive policing tools actually are, how they’re being used, whether they work, and what the risks are, especially when combined with other technologies like facial recognition.  

Listen to a clip here. 

Follow the podcast to be the first to know when this episode is published on Wednesday.   

Also available on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, and all major podcast platforms.

The Hidden Reach of the Prevent Strategy:
Beyond Counter-Terrorism Units

The UK government’s anti-radicalisation program, Prevent, is reportedly sharing the personal details of thousands of individuals more extensively than previously known. This sharing includes not just counter-terrorism units, but also airports, ports, immigration services, and officials at the Home Office and the Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO). Critics argue that such widespread data sharing could be illegal, as it involves moving sensitive personal data between databases without the consent of the individuals. 

A Metropolitan police document titled “Prevent case management guidance” indicates that Prevent details are also shared with the ports authority watchlist. This raises concerns that individuals may face increased scrutiny at airports or be subjected to counter-terrorism powers without reasonable suspicion. The document also mentions that foreign nationals may have their backgrounds checked by the FCDO and immigration services for any overseas convictions or intelligence. 

Furthermore, the Acro Criminal Records Office, which manages UK criminal records, is notified about individuals referred to Prevent, despite the program dealing with individuals who haven’t necessarily engaged in criminal behaviour.
Counter-terror police emphasise their careful approach to data sharing, which aims to protect vulnerable individuals. 

Prevent’s goal is to divert people from terrorism before they offend, and most people are unaware of their referral to the program. 95% of referrals result in no further action. A secret database, the National Police Prevent Case Management database, was previously disclosed in 2019, revealing the storage of details of those referred to Prevent. 

Newly disclosed information, obtained through a freedom of information request by the Open Rights Group (ORG), reveals that Prevent data is shared across various police databases, including the Police National Computer, specialised counter-terrorism and local intelligence systems, and the National Crime Agency. 

The sharing of this data was accidentally revealed due to a redaction error in a heavily edited Met document. Despite its sensitive nature, the ORG decided to make the document public. Sophia Akram of the ORG expressed concerns over the extent of the data sharing and potential harms, suggesting that it could be unfair and possibly unlawful. 

The guidance also indicates that data is retained and used even in cases where no further action is taken. There are concerns about the impact on young people’s educational opportunities, as Prevent requires public bodies like schools and the police to identify individuals at risk of extremism. 

Recent figures show thousands of referrals to Prevent, predominantly from educational institutions. From April 2022 to March 2023, a total of 6,817 individuals were directed to the Prevent program. Within this group, educational institutions were responsible for 2,684 referrals. Breaking down the referrals by age, there were 2,203 adolescents between the ages of 15 and 20, and 2,119 referrals involved children aged 14 or younger.

There are worries about the long-term consequences for children and young people referred to the program. Several cases have highlighted the intrusive nature of this data sharing and its potential impact on individuals’ lives. Cases in which students have missed gaining a place at a sixth form college and other cases involving children as young as four years old.  

Prevent Watch, an organisation monitoring the program, has raised alarms about the data sharing, particularly its effect on young children. The FoI disclosures challenge the notion that Prevent is non-criminalising, as data on individuals, even those marked as ‘no further action’, can be stored on criminal databases and flagged on watchlists. 

Counter-terrorism policing spokespeople defend the program, emphasising its
multi-agency nature and focus on protecting people from harm. They assert that data sharing is carefully managed and legally compliant, aiming to safeguard vulnerable individuals from joining terror groups or entering conflict zones. 

Learn more about data sharing with our UK GDPR Practitioner Certificate. Dive into the issues discussed in this blog and secure your spot now.

The NHS-Palantir Deal: A Pandora’s Box for Patient Privacy? 

The National Health Service (NHS) of England’s recent move to sign a £330 million deal with Palantir Technologies Inc. has set off alarm bells in the realm of patient privacy and data protection. Palantir, a data analytics company with roots in the U.S. intelligence and military sectors, is now at the helm of creating a mammoth NHS data platform. This raises critical questions: Is patient privacy the price of progress? 

The Controversial Contractor 

Palantir’s pedigree of working closely with entities like the CIA and its contribution to the UK Ministry of Defence has painted a target on the back of the NHS’s decision. This association, coupled with its founder’s contentious remarks about the NHS, casts a long shadow over the appointment. Critics highlight Palantir’s controversial history, notably its involvement in supporting the US immigration enforcement’s stringent policies under the Trump administration. The ethical ramifications of such affiliations are profound, given the sensitive nature of health data. Accenture, PwC, NECS and Carnall Farrar will all support Palantir, NHS England said on Tuesday. 

Data Security vs. Data Exploitation 

NHS England assures that the new “federated data platform” (FDP) will be a secure, privacy-enhancing technology that will revolutionise care delivery. The promise is a streamlined, efficient service with live data at clinicians’ fingertips. However, the concern of the potential for data exploitation looms large. Can a firm, with a not-so-distant history of aiding in surveillance, be trusted with the most intimate details of our lives—our health records? 

The Right to Opt-Out: A Right Denied? 

The debate intensifies around the right—or the apparent lack thereof—for patients to opt out of this data sharing. With the NHS stating that all data will be anonymised and used solely for “direct patient care,” they argue that an opt-out is not necessary. Yet, this has not quelled the concerns of privacy advocates and civil liberty groups who foresee a slippery slope towards a panopticon oversight of personal health information. 

Skepticism is further fuelled by the NHS’s troubled history with data projects, where previous attempts to centralise patient data have collapsed under public opposition. The fear that history might repeat itself is palpable, and the NHS’s ability to sway public opinion in favour of the platform remains a significant hurdle. 

Conclusion 

As we venture further into an age where data is king, the NHS-Palantir partnership is a litmus test for the delicate balance between innovation and privacy. The NHS’s venture is indeed ambitious, but it must not be deaf to the cacophony of concerns surrounding patient privacy. Transparency, robust data governance, and the right to opt out must not be side-lined in the pursuit of technological advancement. After all, when it comes to our personal health data, should we not have the final say in who holds the keys to our digital lives? 

Take a look at our highly popular Data Ethics Course. Places fill up fast so if you would like learn more in this fascinating area, book your place now. 

All Go for UK to US Data Transfers 

On 10th July 2023, the European Commission adopted its adequacy decision under Article 45 of GDPR for the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework (DPF).
It concluded that the United States ensures an adequate level of protection, comparable to that of the European Union, for personal data transferred from the EU to US companies under the new framework. It means that personal data can flow safely from the EU to US companies participating in the Framework, without having to put in place additional data protection safeguards under the GDPR. 

The question then is, “What about transfers from the UK to the US which were not covered by the above?” The Data Protection (Adequacy) (United States of America) Regulations 2023 (SI 2023/1028) will come into force on 12th October 2023. The effect of the Regulations will be that, as of 12th October 2023, a transfer of personal data from the UK to an entity in the USA which has self-certified to the Trans-Atlantic EU-US Data Privacy Framework and its UK extension and which will abide by the EU-US Data Privacy Framework Principles, will be deemed to offer an adequate level of protection for personal data and shall be lawful in accordance with Article 45(1) UK GDPR.  

Currently, data transfers from the UK to the US under the UK GDPR must either be based on a safeguard, such as standard contractual clauses or binding corporate rules, or fall within the scope of a derogation under Article 49 UK GDPR. 

UK Data Controllers need to update privacy policies and document their own processing activities as necessary to reflect any changes in how they transfer personal data to the US. 

The new US – EU Data Privacy Framework will be discussed in detail on our forthcomingInternational Transfers workshop. 

New GDPR Adequacy Decision for the EU-US Data Privacy Framework 

On 10th July 2023, the European Commission adopted its adequacy decision under Article 45 of GDPR for the EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework (DPF). Thus, ends years of uncertainty and legal risk for European organisations wishing to transfer personal data to the US. In May, Meta Ireland (the owner of Facebook) was the subject of the largest ever GDPR fine of €1.2bn (£1bn) when Ireland’s Data Protection Commission ruled that its US data transfers were not GDPR compliant.  The new adequacy decision concludes that the United States ensures an adequate level of protection, comparable to that of the European Union, for personal data transferred from the EU to US companies under the new framework. Personal data can now flow safely from the EU to US companies participating in the Framework, without having to put in place additional data protection safeguards under the GDPR. 

The Journey to Adequacy 

In July 2020, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in “Schrems II”, ruled that organisations that transfer personal data to the USA can no longer rely on the Privacy Shield Framework as a legal transfer tool as it failed to protect the rights of EU data subjects when their data was accessed by U.S. public authorities. In particular, the ECJ found that US surveillance programs are not limited to what is strictly necessary and proportionate as required by EU law and hence do not meet the requirements of Article 52 of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights. Secondly, with regard to U.S. surveillance, EU data subjects lack actionable judicial redress and, therefore, do not have a right to an effective remedy in the USA, as required by Article 47 of the EU Charter. The ECJ stated that organisations transferring personal data to the USA can still use the Article 49 GDPR derogations or standard contractual clauses (SCCs). If using the latter, whether for transfers to the USA or other countries, the ECJ placed the onus on the data exporter to make a complex assessment about the recipient country’s data protection legislation (a Transfer Impact Assessment or TIA), and to put in place “additional measures” to those included in the SCCs. Since the Schrems ruling, replacing the Privacy Shield has been a priority for EU and US officials. In March 2022, it was announced that a new  Trans-Atlantic Data Privacy Framework had been agreed in principle. The US President signed an executive order in October, giving effect to the US commitments in the framework, and paving the way for the European Commission to publish a draft ‘adequacy decision’ on 14th December 2022. 


The Changes

The EU-U.S. Data Privacy Framework (DPF) introduces new binding safeguards to address all the concerns raised by the European Court of Justice in Schrems. This includes limiting access to EU data by US intelligence services to what is necessary and proportionate, and establishing a Data Protection Review Court (DPRC), to which EU individuals will have access. The new framework introduces significant improvements compared to the mechanism that existed under the Privacy Shield. For example, if the DPRC finds that data was collected in violation of the new safeguards, it will be able to order the deletion of the data. The new safeguards in the area of government access to data will complement the obligations that US companies importing data from the EU will have to subscribe to. EU individuals will also benefit from several redress avenues in case their data is wrongly handled by US companies. This includes free of charge independent dispute resolution mechanisms and an arbitration panel. 


The Mechanics 

Just like the old Privacy Shield, US companies can self-certify their participation in the DPF by committing to comply with a detailed set of privacy obligations. These could include privacy principles such as purpose limitation, data minimisation and data retention, as well as specific obligations concerning data security and the sharing of data with third parties. The DPF will be administered by the US Department of Commerce, which will process applications for certification and monitor whether participating companies continue to meet the certification requirements. Compliance will be enforced by the US Federal Trade Commission. Many US companies remain self-certified to Privacy Shield standards. Consequently, it is no going to be a difficult task for them to transition to the DPF. As far as EU organisations go all they need to do now, before making a transfer of personal data to the US, is check that the organisation receiving their personal data is certified under the DPF. More information including the self-certification process is expected to be posted on the U.S. Department of Commerce’s new Data Privacy Framework website

Impact on Other Data Transfer Tools  

The safeguards that have been put in place by the US Government in the area of national security (including the redress mechanism) apply to all data transfers under the GDPR to companies in the US, regardless of the transfer mechanism used. These safeguards therefore also facilitate the use of other transfer tools, such as standard contractual clauses and binding corporate rules. This means that, when conducting a transfer impact assessment, a data controller can refer to the DPF adequacy decision as a conclusive finding by the European Commission that the 2 big protections introduced in the USA by the related Executive Order are applicable to transfers under your SCCs and provide suitable restrictions on government surveillance plus suitable redress for EEA data subjects. This makes any needed transfer impact assessment for the USA very straightforward. 
It is important to note that this adequacy decision only covers transfers of personal data from the EU to the US. The UK Government is also working on an adequacy finding for the US and this decision should expedite the process. 

The new US – EU Data Privacy Framework will be discussed in detail on our forthcomingInternational Transfers workshop.

To Share or Not to Share; That is the Question! 

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On 5th October 2021 the Data Sharing Code of Practice from the Information Commissioner’s Office came into effect for UK based Data Controllers.  

The code is not law nor does it ‘enforce’ data sharing, but it does provide some useful steps to consider when sharing personal data either as a one off or as part of an ongoing arrangement. Data Protection professionals, and the staff in the organisations they serve, will still need to navigate a way through various pressures, frameworks, and expectations on the sharing of personal data; case by case, framework by framework. A more detailed post on the contents of the code can be read here.  

Act Now Training is pleased to announce a new full day ‘hands on’ workshop for Data Protection professionals on Data Sharing. Our expert trainer, Scott Sammons, will look at the practical steps to take, sharing frameworks and protocols, risks to consider etc. Scott will also explore how, as part of your wider IG framework, you can establish a proactive support framework; making it easier for staff to understand their data sharing obligations/expectations and driving down the temptation to use a ‘Data Protection Duck out’ for why something was shared/not shared inappropriately.  

Delegates will also be encouraged to bring a data sharing scenario to discuss with fellow delegates and the tutor. This workshop can also be customised and delivered to your organisation at your premises or virtually. Get in touch to learn more.

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GDPR News Roundup

So much has happened in the world of data protection recently. Where to start?

International Transfers

In April, the European Data Protection Board’s (EDPB) opinions (GDPR and Law Enforcement Directive (LED)) on UK adequacy were adopted. The EDPB has looked at the draft EU adequacy decisions. It acknowledge that there is alignment between the EU and UK laws but also expressed some concerns. It has though issued a non-binding opinion recommending their acceptance. If accepted the two adequacy decisions will run for an initial period of four years. More here.

Last month saw the ICO’s annual data protection conference go online due to the pandemic. Whilst not the same as a face to face conference, it was still a good event with lots of nuggets for data protection professionals including the news that the ICO is working on bespoke UK standard contractual clauses (SCCs) for international data transfers. Deputy Commissioner Steve Wood said: 

“I think we recognise that standard contractual clauses are one of the most heavily used transfer tools in the UK GDPR. We’ve always sought to help organisations use them effectively with our guidance. The ICO is working on bespoke UK standard clauses for international transfers, and we intend to go out for consultation on those in the summer. We’re also considering the value to the UK for us to recognise transfer tools from other countries, so standard data transfer agreements, so that would include the EU’s standard contractual clauses as well.”

Lloyd v Google 

The much-anticipated Supreme Court hearing in the case of Lloyd v Google LLC took place at the end of April. The case concerns the legality of Google’s collection and use of browser generated data from more than 4 million+ iPhone users during 2011-12 without their consent.  Following the two-day hearing, the Supreme Court will now decide, amongst other things, whether, under the DPA 1998, damages are recoverable for ‘loss of control’ of data without needing to identify any specific financial loss and whether a claimant can bring a representative action on behalf of a group on the basis that the group have the ‘same interest’ in the claim and are identifiable. The decision is likely to have wide ranging implications for representative actions, what damages can be awarded for and the level of damages in data protection cases. Watch this space!

Ticketmaster Appeal

In November 2020, the ICO fined Ticketmaster £1.25m for a breach of Articles 5(1)(f) and 32 GPDR (security). Ticketmaster appealed the penalty notice on the basis that there had been no breach of the GDPR; alternatively that it was inappropriate to impose a penalty, and that in any event the sum was excessive. The appeal has now been stayed by the First-Tier Tribunal until 28 days after the pending judgment in a damages claim brought against Ticketmaster by 795 customers: Collins & Others v Ticketmaster UK Ltd (BL-2019-LIV-000007). 

Age Appropriate Design Code

This code came into force on 2 September 2020, with a 12 month transition period. The Code sets out 15 standards organisations must meet to ensure that children’s data is protected online. It applies to all the major online services used by children in the UK and includes measures such as providing default settings which ensure that children have the best possible access to online services whilst minimising data collection and use.

With less than four months to go (2 September 2021) the ICO is urging organisations and businesses to make the necessary changes to their online services and products. We are planning a webinar on the code. Get in touch if interested.

AI and Automated Decision Making

Article 22 of GDPR provides protection for individuals against purely automated decisions with a legal or significant impact. In February, the Court of Amsterdam ordered Uber, the ride-hailing app, to reinstate six drivers who it was claimed were unfairly dismissed “by algorithmic means.” The court also ordered Uber to pay the compensation to the sacked drivers.

In April EU Commission published a proposal for a harmonised framework on AI. The framework seeks to impose obligations on both providers and users of AI. Like the GDPR the proposal includes fine levels and an extra-territorial effect. (Readers may be interested in our new webinar on AI and Machine Learning.)

Publicly Available Information

Just because information is publicly available it does not provide a free pass for companies to use it without consequences. Data protection laws have to be complied with. In November 2020, the ICO ordered the credit reference agency Experian Limited to make fundamental changes to how it handles personal data within its direct marketing services. The ICO found that significant ‘invisible’ processing took place, likely affecting millions of adults in the UK. It is ‘invisible’ because the individual is not aware that the organisation is collecting and using their personal data. Experian has lodged an appeal against the Enforcement Notice.

Interesting that recently the Spanish regulator has fined another credit reference agency, Equifax, €1m for several failures under the GDPR. Individuals complained about Equifax’s use of their personal data which was publicly available. Equifax had also failed to provide the individuals with a privacy notice. 

Data Protection by Design

The Irish data protection regulator issued its largest domestic fine recently. Irish Credit Bureau (ICB) was fined €90,000 following a change in the ICB’s computer code in 2018 resulted in 15,000 accounts having incorrect details recorded about their loans before the mistake was noticed. Amongst other things, the decision found that the ICB infringed Article 25(1) of the GDPR by failing to implement appropriate technical and organisational measures designed to implement the principle of accuracy in an effective manner and to integrate the necessary safeguards into the processing in order to meet the requirements of the GDPR and protect the rights of data subjects (aka DP by design and by default). 

Data Sharing 

The ICO’s Data Sharing Code of Practice provides organisations with a practical guide on how to share personal data in line with data protection law. Building on the code, the ICO recently outlined its plans to update its guidance on anonymisation and pseudonymisation, and to explore the role that privacy enhancing technologies might play in enabling safe and lawful data sharing.

UK GDPR Handbook

The UK GDPR Handbook is proving very popular among data protection professionals.

It sets out the full text of the UK GDPR laid out in a clear and easy to read format. It cross references the EU GDPR recitals, which also now form part of the UK GDPR, allowing for a more logical reading. The handbook uses a unique colour coding system that allows users to easily identify amendments, insertions and deletions from the EU GDPR. Relevant provisions of the amended DPA 2018 have been included where they supplement the UK GDPR. To assist users in interpreting the legislation, guidance from the Information Commissioner’s Office, Article 29 Working Party and the European Data Protection Board is also signposted. Read what others have said:

“A very useful, timely, and professional handbook. Highly recommended.”

“What I’m liking so far is that this is “just” the text (beautifully collated together and cross-referenced Articles / Recital etc.), rather than a pundits interpretation of it (useful as those interpretations are on many occasions in other books).”

“Great resource, love the tabs. Logical and easy to follow.”

Order your copy here.

These and other GDPR developments will also be discussed in detail in our online GDPR update workshop next week.

A New (GDPR) Data Sharing Code

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The law on data sharing is a minefield clouded with myths and misunderstandings.
The Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) recently launched a consultation on an updated draft code of practice on this subject. Before drafting the new code, the ICO launched a call for views in August 2018, seeking input from various organisations such as trade associations and those representing the interests of individuals. (Read a summary of the responses here). The revised code will eventually replace the version made under the Data Protection Act 1998, first published in 2011.

The new code does not impose any additional barriers to data sharing, but aims to help organisations comply with their legal obligations under the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA 2018).
Launching the consultation, which will close on 9th September 2019, the ICO said the code will:

“… address many aspects of the new legislation including transparency, lawful bases for processing, the new accountability principle and the requirement to record processing activities”.

Once finalised, the code will be a statutory code of practice under section 121 of the DPA 2018. Under section 127, the ICO must take account of it when considering whether a Data Controller has complied with its data protection obligations in relation to data sharing. The code can also be used in evidence in court proceedings and the courts must take its provisions into account wherever relevant.

Following the code, along with other ICO guidance, will help Data Controllers to manage risks; meet high standards; clarify any misconceptions about data sharing; and give confidence to share data appropriately and correctly. In addition to the statutory guidance, the code contains some optional good practice recommendations, which aim to help Data Controllers adopt an effective approach to data protection compliance.
It also covers some special cases, such as databases and lists, sharing information about children, data sharing in an emergency, and the ethics of data sharing.Reference is also made to the provisions of the Digital Economy Act 2017 which seeks to promote data sharing across the public sector

There is also section on sharing data for the purposes of law enforcement processing under Part 3 of the DPA 2018. This is an important area which organisations have not really understood as demonstrated by the recent High Court ruling that Sussex Police unlawfully shared personal data about a vulnerable teenager putting her “at greater risk.”

Steve Wood, the Deputy Information Commissioner for Policy, said:

“Data sharing brings many benefits to organisations and individuals, but it needs to be done in compliance with data protection law.”

“Our draft data sharing code gives practical advice and guidance on how to share data safely and fairly, and we are encouraging organisations to send us their comments before we launch the final code in the Autumn.”

You can respond to the consultation via the ICO’s online survey, or email datasharingcode@ico.org.uk until Monday 9 September 2019.

More on these and other developments in our GDPR update workshop presented by Ibrahim Hasan. Looking for a GDPR qualification? Our practitioner certificate is the best option.

The Facebook Data Breach Fine Explained

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On 24th October the Information Commissioner imposed a fine (monetary penalty) of £500,000 on Facebook Ireland and Facebook Inc (which is based in California, USA) for breaches of the Data Protection Act 1998.  In doing so the Commissioner levied the maximum fine that she could under the now repealed DPA 1998. Her verdict was that the fine was ‘appropriate’ given the circumstances of the case.  For anyone following the so-called Facebook data scandal the fine might seem small beer for an organisation that is estimated to be worth over 5 billion US Dollars. Without doubt, had the same facts played out after 25th May 2018 then the fine would arguably have been much higher, reflecting the gravity and seriousness of the breach and the number of people affected.

The Facts

In summary, the Facebook (FB) companies permitted Dr Aleksandr Kogan to operate a third-party application (“App”) that he had created, known as “thisisyourdigitallife” on the FB platform. The FB companies allowed him and his company (Global Science Research (GSR) to operate the app in conjunction with FB from November 2013 to May 2015. The app was designed to and was able to obtain a significant amount of personal information from any FB user who used the app, including:

  • Their public FB profile, date of birth and current city
  • Photographs they were tagged in
  • Pages they liked
  • Posts on their time lime and their news feed posts
  • Friends list
  • Facebook messages (there was evidence to suggest the app also accessed the content of the messages)

The app was also designed to and was able to obtain extensive personal data from the FB friends of the App’s users and anyone who had messaged the App user. Neither the FB friends or people who had sent messages were informed that the APP was able to access their data, and nor did they give their consent.

The APP was able to use the information that it collected about users, their friends and people who had messaged them, in order to generate personality profiles. The information and also the data derived from the information was shared by Dr Kogan and his company with three other companies, including SCL Elections Ltd (which controls the now infamous Cambridge Analytica).

Facebook Fine Graphic

In May 2014 Dr Kogan sought permission to migrate the App to a new version of the FB platform. This new version reduced the ability of apps to access information about the FB friends of users. FB refused permission straight away. However, Dr Kogan and GSR continued to have access to, and therefore retained, the detailed information about users and the friends of its users that it had previously collected via their App. FB did nothing to make Dr Kogan or his company delete the information.  The App remained in operation until May 2015.

Breach of the DPA

The Commissioner’s findings about the breach make sorry reading for FB and FB users. Not only did the FB companies breach the Data Protection Act, they also failed to comply or ensure compliance with their own FB Platform Policy, and were not aware of this fact until exposed by the Guardian newspaper in December 2015.

The FB companies had breached s 4 (4) DPA 1998  by failing to comply with the 1stand 7th data protection principles. They had:

  1. Unfairly processed personal data in breach of 1st data protection principle (DPP1). FB unfairly processed personal data of the App users, their friends and those who exchanged messages with users of the APP. FB failed to provide adequate information to FB users that their data could be collected by virtue of the fact that their friends used the App or that they exchanged messages with APP users. FB tried, unsucesfully and unfairly, to deflect responsibility onto the FB users who could have set their privacy settings to prevent their data from being collected. The Commissioner rightly rejected this. The responsibility was on Facebooks to inform users about the App and what information it would collect and why. FB users should have been given the opportunity to withhold or give their consent. If any consent was purportedly  given by users of the APP or their friends, it was invalid because it was not freely given , specific or informed. Conseqauntly, consent did not provide a lawful basis for processing
  2. Failed to take appropriate technical and organisational measures against unauthorised or unlawful processing of personal data, in breach of the 7th data protection principle (DPP7). The processing by Dr Kogan and GSR was unauthorised (it was inconsistent with basis on which FB allowed Dr Kogan to obtain access of personal data for which they were the data controller; it breached the Platform Policy and the Undertaking. The processing by DR Kogan and his company was also unlawful, because it was unfair processing.  The FB companies failed to take steps (or adequate steps) to guard against and unlawful processing.  (See below). The Commissioner considered that the FB companies knew or ought to have known that there was a serious risk of contravention of the data protection principle sand they failed to take reasonable steps to prevent such a contravention.

Breach of FB Platform Policy

Although the FB companies operated a FB Platform Policy in relation to Apps, they failed to ensure that the App operated in compliance with the policy, and this constituted their breach of the 7th data protection principle. For example, they didn’t check Dr Kogan’s terms and conditions of use of the APP to see whether they were consistent with their policy (or presumably whether they were lawful). In fact they failed to implement a system to carry out such a review. It was also found that the use of the App breached the policy in a number of respects, specifically:

  • Personal data obtained about friends of users should only have been used to improve the experience of App users. Instead Dr Kogan and GSR was able to use it for their own purposes.
  • Personal data collected by the APP should not be sold or third parties. Dr Kogan and GSR had transferred the data to three companies.
  • The App required permission from users to obtain personal data that the App did not need in breach of the policy.

The FB companies also failed to check that Dr Kogan was complying with an undertaking he had given in May 2014 that he was only using the data for research, and not commercial, purposes. However perhaps one of the worst indictments is that FB only became aware that the App was breaching its own policy when the Guardian newspaper broke the story on December 11 2015. It was only at this point, when the story went viral, that FB terminate the App’s access right to the Facebook Login. And the rest, as they say, is history.

Joint Data Controllers

The Commissioner decided that Facebook Ireland and Facebook Inc were, at all material times joint data controllers and therefore jointly and severally liable. They were joint data controllers of the personal data of data subjects who are resident outside Canada and the USA and whose personal data is processed by or in relation to the operation of the Facebook platform. This was on the basis that the two companies made decisions about how to operate the platform in respect of the personal data of FB users.

The Commissioner also concluded that they processed personal data in the context of a UK establishment, namely FB UK (based in London) in respect of any individuals who used the FB site from the UK during the relevant period. This finding was necessary in order to bring the processing within scope of the DPA and for the Commissioner to exercise jurisdiction of the two Facebook companies.

The Use of Data Analytics for Political Purposes

The Commissioner considered that some of the data that was shared by Dr Kogan and his company, with the three companies is likely to have been used in connection with, or for the purposes of, political campaigning. FB denied this as far as UK residents were concerned and the Commissioner was unable, on the basis of information before her, whether FN was correct. However, she nevertheless concluded that the personal data of UK users who were UK residents was put at serious risk of being shared and used in connection with political campaigning. In short Dr Kogan and/or his company were in apposition where they were at liberty to decide how to use the personal data of UK residents, or who to share it with.

As readers will know, this aspect of the story continues to attract much media attention about the possible impact of the data sharing scandal on the US Presidential elections and the Brexit referendum. The Commissioner’s conclusions are quite guarded, given the lack of evidence or information available to her.

Susan Wolf will be delivering these upcoming workshops and the forthcoming FOI: Contracts and Commercial Confidentiality workshop which is taking place on the 10th December in London. 

Our 2019 calendar is now live. We are running GDPR and DPA 2018 workshops throughout the UK. Head over to our website to book your place now. 

Need to prepare for a DPO/DP Lead role? Train with Act Now on our hugely popular GDPR Practitioner Certificate.

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New Data Sharing Powers in the Digital Economy Bill

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Much has been written about the complexities of the current legal regime relating to public sector data sharing. Over the years this blog has covered many stops and starts by the government when attempting to make the law clearer.

The Digital Economy Bill is currently making its way through Parliament. It contains provisions, which will give public authorities (including councils) more power to share personal data with each other as well as in some cases the private sector.

The Bill has been a long time coming and is an attempt by the Government to restore some confidence in data sharing after the Care.Data fiasco. It follows a consultation which ended in April with the publication of the responses.

The Bill will give public authorities a legal power to share personal data for four purposes:

  1. To support the well being of individuals and households. The specific objectives for which information can be disclosed under this power will be set out in Regulations (which can be added to from time to time). The objectives in draft regulations so far include identifying and supporting troubled families, identifying vulnerable people who may need help re tuning their televisions after changes to broadcasting bands and providing direct discounts on energy bills for people living in fuel poverty.
  2. For the purpose of debt collection and fraud prevention. Public authorities will be able to set up regular data sharing arrangements for public sector debt collection and fraud prevention but only after such arrangements have been through a business case and government approval process.
  3. Enabling public authorities to access civil registration data (births, deaths and marriages) (e.g. to prevent the sending of letters to people who have died).
  4. Giving the Office for National Statistics access to detailed administrative government data to improve their statistics.

The new measures are supported by statutory Codes of Practice (currently in draft) which provide detail on auditing and enforcement processes and the limitations on how data may be used, as well as best practice in handling data received or used under the provisions relating to public service delivery, civil registration, debt, fraud, sharing for research purposes and statistics. Security and transparency are key themes in all the codes. Adherence to the 7th Data Protection Principle (under Data Protection Act 1998 (DPA)) and the ICO’s Privacy Notices Code (recently revised) will be essential.

A new criminal offence for unlawful disclosure of personal data is introduced by the Bill. Those found guilty of an offence will face imprisonment for a term up to two years, a fine or both. The prison element will be welcomed by the ICO which has for a while been calling for tougher sentences for people convicted of stealing personal data under the DPA.

The Information Commissioner was consulted over the codes so (hopefully!) there should be no conflict with the ICO Data Sharing Code. The Bill is not without its critics (including Big Brother Watch) , many of whom argue that it is too vague and does not properly safeguard individuals’ privacy.

It is also an oversight on the part of the drafters that it does not mention the new General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which will come into force on 25th May 2018. This is much more prescriptive in terms of Data Controllers’ obligations especially on transparency and privacy notices.

These and other Information Sharing developments will be examined in our data protection workshops and forthcoming webinar.

Illustration provided by the Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada (www.priv.gc.ca)