Our survey said…

 

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I bought a new car. On delivery day it was in the showroom draped in a royal blue cloth with a sign saying Reserved for Mr Onassis. The salesman before handing me the keys mumbled in an apologetic fashion “The Sales Manager likes to talk to every customer when they take delivery…”

The Sales Manager didn’t waste much time. He said that I’d shortly be receiving a call from a company who surveys new car buyers to find out what they thought of the dealership. Then he slipped in the hard sell. “They’ll ask you to mark us on a scale of 1 to 10. Only 9 and 10 are positive; anything below that is negative.”

The survey duly arrived. I declined to answer even though I was very happy with the car and the dealership.

Days later my bank called me. I was probably going to be asked to rate my bank. From a list of phrases from very displeased to very pleased I had to choose the phrase that best described my experience. “Please be sure to say you’re very pleased with our service. Anything else is considered negative”. Again I declined to do the survey even though my bank is pretty awful.

Last week a hotel that Act Now Training uses did the same thing. Please let us know what you think of our hotel. This time the hotel manager foolishly put his suggestion “Actually it’s a yes/no question; anything under 8 is negative. We need 9s and 10s” in an email. Now we have the evidence that the practice exists. Previously the conspiracy had only survived by word of mouth.

I haven’t answered yet.

What value does a survey have when the surveyees are primed to deliver the response the company wants? Is every survey result is the product of a self selecting group – the group of people who like to give high scores in surveys? Or is there another group like me who never participate in the survey who feel there’s no value in a survey where the traditional Likert scale has been morphed into a 50/50 shot? Most brits are stiff upper lip types who won’t take a survey if their views would have been critical in case someone contacted them afterwards.

Is the information age producing better information or is the value or a survey subjective, objective or merely the result of a carefully orchestrated customer manipulation.

This article already had 12,500 likes before I posted it. Find them on Ebay.

Paul Simpkins is a Director and Trainer at Act Now Training Ltd. He will be delivering the internationally recognized BCS certificate in Data Protection in June. If you are interested in this or any other Act Now training courses on Information governance, please visit our website www.actnow.org.uk

Controlling, Lying and Blocking: Ways for the individual to win the privacy arms race?

This is a version of Marion Oswald’s speech at the launch of the Centre for Law & Information Policy at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies on 24 February 2015.

DPA5My talk is about controlling, lying and blocking. Could these activities enable an individual to win the privacy arms race against the data collection, surveillance, behavioural tracking and profiling abilities of search engines, marketers, social networking sites and others?

When we think about an arms race, we might imagine two sides evenly matched, both equally able to equip themselves with weapons and defences. But when it comes to individuals versus data collectors, the position is considerably unbalanced, the equivalent of a cavalry charge against a tank division.

It’s not however as if the individual is without protections. Let’s take consent, a key principle, as we know, of European data protection law. Consent based on privacy policies is rather discredited as an effective means of enforcing privacy rights over data held by commercial third parties. If I might quote Lillian Edwards, ‘consent is no guarantee of protection on Facebook and its like, because the consent that is given by users is non-negotiable, non-informed, pressurised and illusory.’[i] So what about regulatory enforcement? In the UK, it could be described as mostly polite, in the rest of Europe, sometimes a little more robust. The FTC in the US has had some notable successes with its enforcement action based on unfair practices, with Jessica Rich, Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection, advocating privacy as being part of the ‘bottom line.’[ii] It remains to be seen whether market pressures will drive good faith changes in privacy practices – alternative subscription, advertising-free business models have failed to make much headway in terms of market share. The so-called ‘right-to-be-forgotten’ has been much debated and I would question how much the Google Spain decision[iii] adds to the individual’s armoury, the original publication remaining unaffected. And as for personal data anonymisation, this could be subject of a whole afternoon’s debate in itself!

What can individuals do if they want to take matters into their own hands, and become a ‘privacy vigilante’?[iv] Here are three possibilities: first, personal data stores (or ‘personal information management services’) are said by their promoters to enable individuals to take back control over their personal data and manage their relationship with suppliers. Pentland from MIT describes a PDS as ‘a combination of a computer network that keeps track of user permissions for each piece of personal data, and a legal contract that specifies both what can and can’t be done with the data, and what happens if there is a violation of the permissions.’[v]

Secondly, blocking. Systems could prevent tagging of individuals by third parties and set privacy defaults at the most protective. Lifelogging technologies could prevent the display of any recognisable image unless that individual has given permission.[vi] Individuals could deploy a recently invented Google Glass detector, which impersonates the Wi-fi network, sends a ‘deauthorisation’ command and cuts the headset’s internet connection.[vii]

Finally, obfuscation, by which technology is used to produce false or misleading data in an attempt, as Murray-Rust et al. put it, to ‘cloud’ the lens of the observer.[viii] It’s the technological equivalent of what most of us will have already done online: missing off the first line of our address when we enter our details into an online form; subtly changing our birthday; accidentally/on-purpose giving an incorrect email address in exchange for a money-off voucher. A personal data store could, for instance, be used to add ‘chaff’ (adding multiple data points amongst the real ones), or simulating real behaviour such as going on holiday. Brunton & Nissenbaum describe obfuscation as a ‘viable and reasonable method of last-ditch privacy protection.’[ix] On the face of it, obfuscation may seem to be an attractive alternative approach, providing individuals with a degree of control over how much ‘real’ information is released and some confidence that profiling activities will be hampered.

Are these methods ways for the individual to win the privacy arms race? As things stand, I have my doubts, although that is not to say that a legal and regulatory regime could not be created to support these methods. PDSs raise numerous questions about contract formation, incorporation, offers and counter-offers. Service providers would need to be prepared to change their business models fundamentally if PIMS are to fulfil their potential. In the short term, there appears to be little commercial incentive for them to do so.

In terms of blocking, systems could adopt protective measures but they don’t, because they don’t have to. Google Glass blockers may well fall foul of computer misuse legislation if used by members of the public rather than the network owner. In the UK, there would be a risk of a section 3 offence under the Computer Misuse Act 1990 – an unauthorised act with intent to impair the operation of any computer. Haddadi et al. suggest the ‘continuous broadcast of a Do-Not-Track beacon from smart devices carried by individuals who prefer not to be subjected to image recognition by wearable cameras’ although the success of this would depend on regulatory enforcement and whether device providers received and conformed to such requests.[x] It would be rather ironic, however, if one had to positively broadcast one’s presence to avoid image recognition.

As for obfuscation or lying on the internet, Murray-Rust et al. distinguish between official data, where obfuscation may be a criminal offence, and other data that can be obfuscated ‘without legal consequence.’[xi] The distinction is unlikely to be so clear cut: both on the civil side, and on the criminal side (fraud and computer misuse spring to mind), and this is something that I’ll be writing about in the future.

I would like to finish with this question about privacy vigilantism: by continuing to shift responsibility onto the individual, is this letting society off-the-hook for finding better solutions to privacy concerns?[xii] I think it probably is. Finding better solutions will require even closer interaction between computer scientists, lawyers and policy-makers.

Marion Oswald is a Senior Fellow and Head of the Centre for Information Rights at the University of Winchester (marion.oswald@winchester.ac.uk @_UoWCIR). This article was first published by the Society for Computers & Law and is reproduced with the author’s kind permission.

The 2nd Winchester Conference on Trust, Risk, Information & the Law on 21 April 2015 will be exploring the theme of the privacy arms race. To book, please click here.


[i] Lillian Edwards, Privacy, law, code and social networking sites, in Research Handbook on Governance of the Internet, (2013) Edward Elgar (Cheltenham) Ian Brown (Ed), 309-352, 324-328

[ii] Jessica Rich, Director, Bureau of Consumer Protection, Federal Trade Commission Beyond Cookies: Privacy Lessons for Online Advertising, AdExchanger Industry Preview 2015, January 21, 2015, 4 http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/620061/150121beyondcookies.pdf

[iii] Google Spain v AEPD and Mario Costeja Gonzalez (C-131/12), 13 May 2014

[iv] Marion Oswald, Seek, and Ye Shall Not Necessarily Find: The Google Spain Decision, the Surveillant on the Street and Privacy Vigilantism, 99-115, Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 2014 (K. O’Hara et al. (Eds)

[v] A. Pentland, Social Physics: How Good Ideas Spread – The Lessons from a New Science, The Penguin Press, New York, 2014

[vi] C. Gurrin, R. Albatal, H. Joho, K. Ishii, ‘A Privacy by Design Approach to Lifelogging’, Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 2014 (K. O’Hara et al. (Eds), 49-73, 68

[vii] A. Greenberg, Cut Off Glassholes’ Wi-Fi With This Google Glass Detector, Wired, June 3, 2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/06/find-and-ban-glassholes-with-this-artists-google-glass-detector/

[viii] D. Murray-Rust, M. Van Kleek, L. Dragan, N. Shadbolt, Social Palimpsests – Clouding the Lens of the Personal Panopticon, 75-96, 76, Digital Enlightenment Yearbook 2014 (K. O’Hara et al. (Eds)

[ix] Finn Brunton, Helen Nissenbaum, ‘Vernacular resistance to data collection and analysis: A political theory of obfuscation’ First Monday, Volume 16, Number 5, 2 May 2011 http://firstmonday.org/article/view/3493/2955

[x] H. Haddadi, A. Alomainy, I. Brown, Quantified Self and the Privacy Challenge in Wearables, Society for Computers & Law, 5 August 2014 http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed38111

[xi] nviii,90

[xii] nix

Data Protection, the Law and Social Media: Keeping Your Boat Afloat

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Paul Gibbons writes…

Social media have been good for me. Without my FOIMan blog and Twitter feed, I would never have been asked to deliver training for Act Now Training, or indeed offered many of the wonderful opportunities that have come my way in the last few years. I’ve made a whole new career off the back of them. Not only has my profile been raised by my use of these tools, but I’ve been able to learn from a whole range of knowledgeable people online – expanding my awareness and horizons way beyond anything I’d have considered possible just five years ago.

But even if I remove my FOIMan cape for a moment, social media has had a significant impact on me. I keep in touch with old friends via Facebook. My CV is widely available to hundreds of business contacts via LinkedIn. Before I book a holiday or dine out, I check Trip Advisor. If I want to know how decisions are made by my local council or indeed the Ministry of Justice, I can submit an FOI request via WhatDoTheyKnow. With an election on the way I can find out my MP’s voting record by consulting TheyWorkForYou, and perhaps write to them to ask what their position is on a particular issue. If I feel particularly strongly about that issue I might add my details to an online petition. Social media in their many forms pervade our lives. Many of us would be lost without them.

And it’s not just individuals that are becoming reliant on it. These tools provide novel ways to engage with the people who use them. Businesses have not been slow to exploit them for marketing and public relations purposes. Politicians – often accused of being remote from their electorate – have, with varying success, used them to speak directly to parts of that group. Academics conduct surveys, then disseminate their research, both via social media. A recent study found that 40% of students use social media as their primary form of communication with lecturers. Journalists also use it to research and report on stories. No television broadcast is complete these days without a hashtag allowing the viewers to interact. The police have used them to investigate or prosecute criminal acts. Central government encourages civil servants to embrace Twitter as a tool to communicate about public policy and gain insights into people’s reaction to it. Local government too, has found social media a productive way to interact with local citizens. We’re only beginning to see the ways in which social media can benefit our businesses, government, work and lifestyles.

However, as with most things, there are downsides. There are the trolls lurking not under a bridge but under assumed names on Twitter, ready to spread their malice. It’s easy to get carried away and post in haste – repenting at our leisure. Just as social media can make careers and boost reputations, it can destroy them overnight. It empowers individuals, and many companies and public bodies have been keen to use it to give a human face to their corporate image. But those same individuals can use it intentionally or not to disfigure that public face. They can disclose confidential information more easily, expose the business to liability for breach of copyright or defamation, and breach the Data Protection Act by discussing personal matters relating to clients, customers or colleagues.

Don’t believe me? Take the social worker who posted information on Facebook about a child protection court case she was involved in, potentially allowing the family to be identified. Or the companies at the centre of Twitter storms. Or sued for using a photographer’s images without permission. In a recent post on my FOIMan site, I highlighted an academic who posted internal correspondence relating to an FOI request on WhatDoTheyKnow, in the process potentially damaging the institution’s reputation, relationships with their colleagues, and almost certainly causing their employer to breach the Data Protection Act’s first data protection principle (to handle personal data fairly and lawfully) in the process. Even those organisations whose employees should know better have had to take disciplinary action: between 2009 and 2014, 519 disciplinary actions were taken against police officers for social media related transgressions, and the Crown Prosecution Service reported that nine of its staff had been disciplined for similar reasons over that period. Not for nothing has the Ministry of Defence warned its employees that “Loose Tweets Sink Fleets”.

The temptation in the face of this litany of institutional and individual disaster is to adopt the ostrich position. Ban your employees from using social media altogether. Avoid their corporate use. This won’t work. For a start, you will miss out on all the benefits highlighted at the start of this piece and more. But besides, it’s way too late for that. Pandora is not just out of the box but is running the show. You could impose contractual obligations on your staff requiring them not to use social media, or at least not to discuss their work there. If you do though you may find yourself losing staff who choose to work for a more progressive employer. In any case, it may be too late, as the Kent Police and Crime Commissioner discovered when she appointed a 17 year old to the post of Youth Police and Crime Commissioner.

You can’t stop your customers or the public writing about you on social media, but if you’re not using it, you’ll only find out what they’re saying about you too late. You’ll have no way to react to adverse comment online save through the traditional media which may not go to press until your business has collapsed clothed only in the tatters of its reputation.

So if you can’t avoid the risks of social media altogether, what can you do? The next best thing is to mitigate those risks. Like any other tool that you use, you need policies setting out acceptable use. You need to secure your most valuable and sensitive information. You need to raise awareness of your policies and legal restrictions so that your employees understand what they are allowed (or even encouraged) to do using social media, and also what they shouldn’t do – and what the consequences of doing it will be.

Where can you find out more about the risks that social media poses to your organisation? Or indeed the opportunities it offers? What should you include in a social media policy? Do you need to keep records of your social media use, and if so, how?

Well, social media itself will offer many solutions if you’re brave enough to jump in. But if you want a guide, my new training course on Data Protection, the Law & Social Media will provide answers to the questions above, and will point you to resources to help your organisation and its employees use social media effectively whilst avoiding the pitfalls. The course runs for the first time in Manchester on 20 April, and in London on 22 April 2015, and can also be run as an in-house course for your Data Protection, Communications and other staff. Get in touch with Act Now Training now for more details or book through their website.

Use of Social Media in Investigations

canstockphoto10560861All investigators, when tackling rogue traders, fraudsters or errant employees, need to make use of the Internet as an investigatory tool. Unfortunately there is a lack of knowledge of Internet investigation techniques amongst investigators especially those working in the public sector. The Internet can reveal a treasure trove of free information, which can even lead to the perpetrators’ door (literally).

Do you have a smartphone and therefore an on-line account for managing email, contacts and messages? Do you use it for accessing applications such Instagram, Flickr (for storing photographs online) and Facebook?

If these applications are used, without properly controlled account settings, then available on-line (for all to see) is your private information, your photographs and other personal data. Even information that you yourself have not uploaded or stored can be mined for more personal information. You might have had photographs taken by a professional, for example for the sale of a home, or at events or weddings, or even by friends and family. These images are then posted on web sites and/or stored on-line (perhaps on Instagram, and Flickr ) often without your knowledge. The images will retain tagging and geo data used by the photographer to catalogue their albums. This might be your postcode, email address, name, or other identifying information. Someone who knows what to look for and where to look can discover a lot about you!

Worrying! But also very useful if you are investigating an individual for criminal or civil offences (or just disciplinary matters). Here are a few examples where such information was used by investigators to find out about individuals clearly “up to no good.”

Case Study 1 – The Malicious Blogger

A Chief Executive of a public sector organisation received an email containing particularly threatening and abusive language and menacing comments. Enquiries about the routing of the email revealed it had been sent from an Internet café.

Just twenty-five minutes of open source research produced a result. The advanced search facilities within Google, and a couple of search facilities specific to social networking sites, identified the full details of the sender. Step one was to search the email address, which revealed a posting on a blog, which in turn revealed a publicly listed unique user name. This was searched and the user was found on a couple of unpleasant blogs linking with others. This in turn led to another user name which was very close to the individual’s real name. This in turn led to his Facebook account, tagged images, and other unpleasant on-line postings. A few minutes later the home address of the perpetrator together with very current photographs were discovered. He was found to be a professional working for a public authority!

Case Study 2 – The Rogue Employee

An employee was suspected of working on his own business whilst off sick from work. Resource intensive and potentially controversial covert surveillance was one of many options considered. However, from just a mobile number this individual was traced to an EBay account using the EBay advanced search facility. As well as identifying the goods for sale through this business venture, the username for this EBay account was linked to a website with a Twitter account. Tweets by this person revealed the exact times and dates when he was working on his own business. Much of what he was doing was taking place when he was at work. A web of business networking and LinkedIn activity was also unravelled detailing far more than what the investigators had imagined.

These are just a couple of examples of investigations where auditors/investigators benefitted from having a thorough knowledge of online investigation techniques. It doesn’t always work this easily but my new course explains the most effective techniques. I also provide practical guidance on how to capture online evidence to accepted national standards.

Any form of surveillance of individuals raises a lot of legal issues (see Ibrahim Hasan’s recent article on the law of employee surveillance). There are pitfalls especially relating to privacy, Data Protection and RIPA to name a few. This course will also give delegates an opportunity to network with others who face the same challenges.

Steve Morris is an ex police officer and one of our expert RIPA course trainers. Steve’s new E Crime and Social Networking Course is proving very popular amongst auditors and investigators wanting to know how to make best use of the Internet when conducting investigations.

How not to write a social media statement.

It’s the coming thing – having a social media policy. Cases such as Wetherspoons vs Preece illustrate the value of having one but there’s good ‘uns and inevitably bad ‘uns.

A family member recently accepted a job in a ski-ing company and they included the following in their T & Cs about Social Media. What do you think of it?

So a young person who’s going out with his mates for a few beers after work needs to seek legal advice before letting alcohol pass his lips in case he says something he wasn’t planning to say about his employer.

You can imagine two young thrusting lawyers sitting in  a bar.

  • “What’s your line then?”
  • “I look after unwittingly defaming people on social media”
  • “Business good?”
  • “Never better”

Do you commit libel? Sounds a bit strong.., Do Drivers commit speed? Do shoplifters commit shoplifting.

How can you tell you’ll unwittingly do something? Or to  really screw it up how can you tell you’ll wittingly do something?

You can’t express your views while you are employed by this company (but it’s only seasonal so by Easter you can say what you want again (Err… no. This contract forbids you from speaking out for the remaining 75 years of your life (my family member is one of those lucky people who will live to be 100)

The final sentence is just plain bizarre. I’d better not sign this contract in case I’m in breach of it…

Who writes this rubbish? I know, of course, but I can’t possibly tell you as I might unwittingly say something I might regret for nearly a century.